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Abstract
We investigate whether the costs of job displacement diﬀer between
blue collar and white collar workers. In the short run earnings and
employment losses are substantial for both groups but stronger for
white collar workes. In the long run, there are only weak eﬀects for
blue collar workers but strong and persistent eﬀects for white collars.
This is consistent with the idea that ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital and
internal labor markets are more important in white-collar than in blue
collar jobs.
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The loss of a job is certainly shaking up someone’s career temporarily, but
might also be a long-term problem for the concerned worker. To which ex-
tent does the type of a worker’s job aﬀect the costs of job displacement?
Theoretical arguments suggest that losing a job associated with ﬁrm-speciﬁc
human capital is more costly in terms of reduced lifetime earnings than losing
a jobs where pay is closely aligned with a worker’s general human capital.
Similarly, workers who are displaced from a manual work, maybe with a piece
rate compensation, are less likely to suﬀer a substantial lifetime earnings loss
than workers who are displaced from their career path on internal labor mar-
kets associated with deferred payment contracts. This paper investigates this
important issue by looking at displacement costs for two broad occupational
groups: white collar and blue collar workers. Arguably, ﬁrm-speciﬁc human
capital, internal labor markets, and career concerns are much more impor-
tant in white collar than in blue collar jobs. When displacement costs are
driven by loss of ﬁrm-speciﬁc rents we should observe higher displacement
costs for white collar than for blue collar workers. (Lazear, 1979)
The issue has not been resolved in the empirical literature: The authors
of country speciﬁc chapters in the book of Kuhn (2002) compare displace-
ment costs across a number of countries and ﬁnd no diﬀerence in terms of
earnings losses across education categories. The displacement costs with re-
spect to unemployment are mixed: In the U.S., Canada, France and Belgium,
more educated workers (who are more frequently found in white collar jobs)
tend to suﬀer less from joblessness after displacement, the reverse is true for
Germany.1
We use an exceptional administrative data set, the Austrian Social Secu-
rity Database (ASSD) to shed new light on the issue. This data set has three
main advantages: First, it is very large and covers the universe of Austrian
employees in the private sector. Second, it contains high-quality and high-
frequency information on the individual workers’ earnings and employment
1Podgursky and Swaim (1987) is a paper explicitly considering a white blue collar
comparison: they ﬁnd lower earnings losses for white collar workers using the Displaced
Worker Survey.
1history over an extended period of time. Third, it contains an employer
identiﬁer that allows us to identify plant-closure events. Furthermore, as
Austrian blue and white collar workers are subject to diﬀerent social secu-
rity rules (with respect to health insurance and insurance against workplace
accidents) measurement error in occupational status can be ruled out.
Taking plant closures as an indicator for exogenous separations from the
job we are able to identify the causal eﬀect of displacement on worker’s
future careers. Our empirical strategy exploits the rich nature of our data
and applies exact matching techniques which makes treatment and control
groups extremely well comparable.
Our empirical ﬁndings point to large and persistent employmentand earn-
ings losses for white collar workers, but more transient and much smaller
losses for blue collar workers. This is consistent with the idea that internal
labor markets and ﬁrm-speciﬁc wage policies are more common among white
collar workers compared to blue collars.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we describe the
data and section 3 details our econometric strategy. Section 4 present our
results and section 5 concludes.
2 Data
Our data set comprises the universe of private sector workers in Austria cov-
ered by the social security system.2 All employment records can be linked
to ﬁrms in which workers are employed. We use quarterly information from
1978 to 1998 on daily employment and monthly earnings. This information
is highly reliable, because social security tax payments for ﬁrms as well as
beneﬁts for workers hinge on these data. Monthly gross earnings are trans-
formed in daily wages taking the ratio of earnings over eﬀective number of
employment days in each month.
We concentrate on workers employed between 1982 and 1988, who are at
risk of a plant closure.3 This allows us to observe the workers’ earnings and
2See Zweim¨ uller et al. (2008) for a description of the data set.
3Workers ”at risk” of a plant closure include the treatment group actually experience
2employment history during 4 years prior to a potential closure and for 10
years afterwards.4 We restrict the analysis to prime-age workers in the age
group 35 - 50; who were employed in ﬁrms with more than 5 employees at
least one quarter during the period 1982 and 1988; and workers with at one
year of tenure with the current employer.
In the ASSD, each ﬁrm has an employer identiﬁer. Exits of ﬁrms occur
when the employer identiﬁer ceases to exist. Some of these cases might not be
true closures and (most of the) employeesjust continue under a new identiﬁer,
for example because of a takeover in a family business. To encounter this
problem, we impose a further restriction: If more than 50% of the employees
continue under a new employer identiﬁcation number we do not consider this
to be a closure.5
Our treatment group comprises 9,656 workers who experienced a plant
closure between 1982 and 1988. Our control group comprises about 1 million
workers from all ﬁrms not going bust during this period. To increase the com-
parability between treated and controls, we perform exact matching between
the treated and control subjects on the following criteria: sex, age, broad
occupation (blue- or white-collar), location of ﬁrm (9 provinces), industry
(30 industries), employment history in the eight quarters before plant clo-
sure.6 We do almost exact matching on continuous variables: average daily
wages in the quarters 8, 9, 10 and 11 before plant closure are matched by
decile group7 and ﬁrm size in the two years before plant closure is matched
by quartile groups. Applying this matching procedure we are able to identify
at least one control subject for 5,570 treated subjects, which are matched to
30,156 controls.8
a layoﬀ as a result of bankruptcy and the control group who does not.
4Establishments from the construction and tourism industries are excluded as tempo-
rary layoﬀs are common in these industries.
5Workers from such establishments are coded as “ambiguous” and are neither in the
treatment nor the control group.
6See Schwerdt (2008) and Ichino et al. (2007) for a more detailed description of the
matching algorithm.
7We do not want to match earnings too close to closure, because of anticipatory wage
eﬀects. See Jacobson et al. (1993) for evidence on wage eﬀects before displacement.
8We experimented also with less restrictive matching algorithms that increase the num-
ber of matches without major quantitative changes in the results.
33 Econometric Strategy
To estimate the eﬀect of an involuntary job loss on future earnings and
employment prospects both for blue and white collar workers we specify
the following model
Yi,t = α + β1,20BLUEiPC iQ
1,20

















i,t + µi + θt + ￿i,t, (1)
where Yi,t denotes the outcome variable (employment status or earnings) of
individual i at quarter t, BLUEi is a dummy variable taking the value one if
individual i is a blue collar worker, PC i is another dummy variable indicating
whether individual i got displaced due to a plant closure and the Qi,t’s are
two dummy variables indicating the time period relative to plant closure
(actual or potential). To keep the problem manageable and results easily
interpretable, we focus on two post-displacement periods: the ”short-run”,
deﬁned as the ﬁrst ﬁve years (twenty quarters, Q
1,20
i,t ) after the displacement
quarter; and the ”long-run” deﬁned as years six to ten after the plant closure
quarter (Q
21,40
i,t ). Moreover, speciﬁcation (1) includes a constant term, α,
individual ﬁxed eﬀects, µi, calendar time eﬀects, θt and an error term, ￿i,t.
The parameters of interestin the present context are β1,20 and β21,40. They
identify, for short- and long-run labor market outcomes respectively, whether
blue collar workers suﬀer more (β1,20 < 0,β 21,40 < 0) or less (β1,20 > 0,
β21,40 > 0) from a plant closure than white collar workers.
4 Results
Figure 1 visualizes the evolution of earnings and employment by broad oc-
cupation and displacement status. Panel A shows the employment proﬁles
for displaced (treated) and non-displaced (control) white collar workers. The
graph shows mean employment rates per quarter over a period of 10 years
4– 5 years before and 10 years after a plant closure. By construction, the
employment rates of displaced and non-displaced white collar workers are
equal to unity in the four quarters prior to the plant closure date (all work-
ers have at least one year of tenure). Employment rates at earlier dates show
that our matching procedure works well: During quarters -16 to -5 (quarters
prior to plant closure) employment rates of treated and controls are identical.
Immediately after the plant closure employment rates for the treated white
collar workers decrease sharply. Only about 50 percent ﬁnd a new job during
the ﬁrst quarter after displacement. Employment rates of displaced white
collar workers catch up during the ﬁrst two years and decrease thereafter but
never reach the level of the non-displaced. (Notice that employment rates
of the non-displaced decrease smoothly after the plant closure quarter. This
reﬂects dissolution of employment relationships that existed at the sampling
date as workers got either unemployed, sick, retired, died, or dropped out of
the labor force for other reasons.)
Panel B shows the corresponding picture for blue collar workers. The
immediate loss in employment after plant closure is somewhat higher for
displaced blue collar workers. However, displaced blue collar workers recover
much faster and, about 6 years after the plant closure quarter, reach a level
that is only slightly below the employmentrates of non-displaced blue collars.
In sum, the graphical analysis shows that employment losses of displaced
white collar workers are permanent and very strong. In contrast, employment
losses for displaced blue collar workers are of a more temporary nature and
small in the long run.
Panels C and D portray the analogous phenomenon for the evolution of
workers’ earnings. The numbers show mean nominal daily earnings, condi-
tional on being employed. Obviously, this measure changes over time due
to increases in real earnings, in inﬂation and in selectivity (because the set
of employed workers changes over time). Just like in panels A and B, we
see a remarkable diﬀerence between white and blue collar workers. Daily
wages for displaced blue collar workers are only slightly below daily wages of
non-displaced blue collars throughout the post-plant closure period. In con-
trast, the earnings proﬁle of displaced white collar workers is substantially
5below the one of their non-displaced colleagues and remains at this lower
level throughout the post-plant closure period.
Table 1 presents regression results from estimating equation (1), both for
employmentand for daily wages. The coeﬃcients in column (1) are estimated
from a linear probability model with the individual’s employment status as
a dependent variable and the coeﬃcients in column (2) are from a regression
with the daily wage as the dependent variable. Both regressions include
individual ﬁxed eﬀects and dummies for calendar months.
Column (1) reveals that displaced white collar workers face substantial
employment losses equal to a .231 reduction in the employment probability
(coeﬃcient of PC iQ
1,20
i,t ) in the short run (years 1 to 5 after displacement)
and a .137 reduction (PC iQ
21,40
i,t ) in the long run (years 6 to 10 after displace-
ment). Displacement eﬀects for blue collar workers are much more moderate
and amount to a decrease in the employment probability of .149 (-.231 +
.082) in the ﬁrst ﬁve post-displacement years and a corresponding decrease
of .046 (-.137 + .091) in post-displacement years 6 to 10.
The blue-white collar diﬀerences in earnings losses are even more strik-
ing. Column (2) shows that earnings losses for displaced white collar are
large both in the short-run (-.079 log points, coeﬃcient of PC iQ
1,20
i,t ) and in
the long-run (-.078 log points, PC iQ
21,40
i,t ). In contrast, blue collar workers’
earnings drop by only .023 log-points (-.079 + .056) in the short-run and by
negligible .006 log-points (-.078 + .072) in the long-run.
5 Conclusion
This paper investigates whether the costs of being displaced from a job diﬀers
by the blue- or white-collar nature the job. Our ﬁndings suggest that both
white collar and blue collar workers experience a decrease in employment
rates and earnings in the short run (during the ﬁrst ﬁve years after a plant
closure). However, for white collar workers these detrimental short-run eﬀects
are much stronger. Moreover, for blue collar workers employment losses are
modest and earnings reductions are negligible in the long run (during years 6
to 10 after a plant-closure event). In contrast, white collar workers experience
6strongly negative employment and earnings eﬀects also in the long run.
Arguably, in white collar jobs career concerns, ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capi-
tal, and internal labor markets are more important than in blue collar jobs.
Blue collar workers do mostly manual work and are frequently paid piece
rates. Hence our results are consistent with the idea that displacement costs
are higher for workers displaced from jobs associated with more job-speciﬁc
rents. Individuals who lose such jobs are confronted with a worse position
on the labor market and experience a major disruption of their career path
not only temporarily but also in the long run.
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F statistic 104.854 561.717
*All regressions include individual ﬁxed eﬀects and dummies for calendar time. Dependent
variables are an employment dummy in column 1 and log daily earnings in column 2.
Clustered standard errors reported in parenthesis.
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